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Abstract. The fact that deep neural networks are susceptible to crafted
perturbations severely impacts the use of deep learning in certain do-
mains of application. Among many developed defense models against
such attacks, adversarial training emerges as the most successful method
that consistently resists a wide range of attacks. In this work, based on an
observation from a previous study that the representations of a clean data
example and its adversarial examples become more divergent in higher
layers of a deep neural net, we propose the Adversary Divergence Reduc-
tion Network which enforces local/global compactness and the clustering
assumption over an intermediate layer of a deep neural network. We con-
duct comprehensive experiments to understand the isolating behavior of
each component (i.e., local/global compactness and the clustering as-
sumption) and compare our proposed model with state-of-the-art adver-
sarial training methods. The experimental results demonstrate that aug-
menting adversarial training with our proposed components can further
improve the robustness of the network, leading to higher unperturbed
and adversarial predictive performances.
Keywords: Adversarial Robustness, Local Compactness, Global Com-
pactness, Clustering assumption
1 Introduction
Despite the great success of deep neural nets, they are reported to be susceptible
to crafted perturbations [27,7], even state-of-the-art ones. Accordingly, many
defense models have been developed, notably [19,29,28,22]. Recently, the work
of [1] undertakes an in-depth study of neural network defense models and conduct
comprehensive experiments on a complete suite of defense techniques, which has
lead to postulating one common reason why many defenses provide apparent
robustness against gradient-based attacks, namely obfuscated gradients.
According to the above study, adversarial training with Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) [19] is one of the most successful and widely-used defense
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2 A. Bui et al.
techniques that remained consistently resilient against attacks, which has in-
spired many recent advances including Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) [12],
Feature Denoising [28], Defensive Quantization [17], Jacobian Regularization
[10], Stochastic Activation Pruning [5], and Adversarial Training Free [24].
In this paper, we propose to build robust classifiers against adversarial exam-
ples by learning better representations in the intermediate space. Given an image
classifier based on a multi-layer neural net, conceptually, we divide the network
into two parts with an intermediate layer: the generator network from the input
layer to the intermediate layer and the classifier network from the intermediate
layer to the output prediction layer. The output of the generator network (i.e.,
the intermediate layer) is the intermediate representation of the input image,
which is fed to the classifier network to make prediction. For image classifiers,
an adversarial example is usually generated by adding small perturbations to
a clean image. The adversarial example may look very similar to the original
image but leads to significant changes to the prediction of the classifier. It has
been observed that in deep neural networks, the representations of a clean data
example and its adversarial example might become very diverge in the interme-
diate space, although their representations are proximal in the data space [28].
Due to the above divergence in the intermediate space, a classifier may be hard
to predict the same class of the adversarial and real images. Inspired by this
observation, we propose to learn better representations that reduce the above
divergence in the intermediate space, so as to enhance the classifier robustness
against adversarial examples.
In particular, we propose an enhanced adversarial training framework that
imposes the local and global compactness properties on the intermediate repre-
sentations, to build more robust classifiers against adversarial examples. Specifi-
cally, by explicitly strengthening local compactness, we enforce the intermediate
representations output from the generator of a clean image and its adversarial
examples to be as proximal as possible. In this way, the classifier network is less
easy to be misled by the adversarial examples. However, enforcing the local com-
pactness itself may not be sufficient to guarantee a robust defense model as the
representations might be encouraged to globally spread out in the intermediate
space, significantly hurting accuracies on both clean and adversarial images. To
address this, we further propose to impose global compactness to encourage the
representations of examples in the same class to be proximal yet those in differ-
ent classes to be more distant. Finally, to increase the generalization capacity
of the deep network and reduce the misclassification of adversarial examples,
our framework enjoys the flexibility to incorporate the clustering assumption
[3], which aims to force the decision boundary of a classifier to lie in the gap
between clusters of different classes. By collaboratively incorporating the above
three properties, we are able to learn better intermediate representations, which
help to boost the adversarial robustness of classifiers. Intuitively, we name our
proposed framework to the Adversary Divergence Reduction Network (ADR).
To comprehensively exam the proposed framework, we conduct extensive ex-
periments to investigate the influence of each component (i.e., local/global com-
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pactness and the clustering assumption), visualize the smoothness of the loss
surface of our robust model, and compare our proposed ADR method with sev-
eral state-of-the-art adversarial defenses. The experimental results consistently
show that our proposed method can further improve over others in terms of
better adversarial and clean predictive performances. The contributions of this
work are summarized as follows:
– We propose the local and global compactness properties on the intermedi-
ate space to enforce the better representations, which lead to more robust
classifiers;
– We incorporate our local and global compactness with clustering assumption
to further enhance adversarial robustness;
– We plug the above three components into an adversarial training framework
to introduce our Adversary Divergence Reduction Network;
– We extensively analyze the proposed framework and compare it with state-
of-the-art adversarial training methods to verify its effectiveness.
2 Related works
Adversarial training defense Adversarial training can be traced back to
[7], in which models were challenged by producing adversarial examples and
incorporating them into training data. The adversarial examples could be the
worst-case examples (i.e., xa , argmaxx′∈Bε(x)` (x′, y, θ)) [7] or most divergent
examples (i.e., xa , argmaxx′∈Bε(x)DKL (hθ (x′) || hθ (x))) [29] where DKL is
the Kullback-Leibler divergence and hθ is the current model. The quality of the
adversarial training defense crucially depends on the strength of the injected
adversarial examples – e.g., training on non-iterative adversarial examples ob-
tained from FGSM or Rand FGSM (a variant of FGSM where the initial point is
randomised) are not robust to iterative attacks, for example PGD [19] or BIM
[15].
Although many defense models were broken by [1], the adversarial training
with PGD [19] was among the few that were resilient against attacks. Many
defense models were developed based on adversarial examples from a PGD attack
or attempts made to improve and scale up the PGD adversarial training. Notable
examples include Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) [12], Feature Denoising [28],
Defensive Quantization [17], Jacobian Regularization [10], Stochastic Activation
Pruning [5], and Adversarial Training for Free [24].
Defense with a latent space These works utilized a latent space to enable
adversarial defense, notably [11]. DefenseGAN [23] and PixelDefense [26] use
a generator (i.e., a pretrained WS-GAN [8] for DefenseGAN and a PixelCNN
[21] for PixelDefense) together with the latent space to find a denoised version
of an adversarial example on the data manifold. These works were criticized
by [1] as being easy to attack and impossible to work within the case of the
CIFAR-10 dataset. Jalal et al. [11] proposed an overpowered attack method to
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efficiently attack both DefenseGAN and PixelDefense and subsequently injected
those adversarial examples to train the model. Though that work was proven to
work well with simple datasets including MNIST and CelebA, no experiments
were conducted on more complex datasets including, for example, CIFAR-10.
3 Proposed method
In what follows, we present our proposed method, named the Adversary Diver-
gence Reduction Network (ADR). As shown in the previous study [28], although
an adversarial example xa and its corresponding clean example x are in close
proximity in the data space (i.e., differ by a small perturbation), when brought
forward up to the higher layers in a deep neural network, their representations
become markedly more divergent, hence causing different prediction results. In-
spired by this observation, we propose imposing local compactness for those
representations in an intermediate layer of a neural network. The key idea is to
enforce that the representations of an adversarial example and its clean coun-
terpart be as proximal as possible, hence reducing the chance of misclassifying
them. Moreover, we observe that enforcing the local compactness itself is not
sufficient to guarantee a robust defense model as this enforcement might en-
courage representations to globally spread out across the intermediate space
(i.e., the space induced by the intermediate representations), significantly hurt-
ing both adversarial and clean performances. To address this, we propose to
impose global compactness for the intermediate representations such that repre-
sentations of examples that belong in the same class are proximal and those in
different classes are more distant. Finally, to increase the generalization capacity
of the deep network and reduce the misclassification of adversarial examples, we
propose to apply the clustering assumption [3] which aims to force the decision
boundary to lie in the gap between clusters of different classes, hence increasing
the chance for adversarial examples to be correctly classified.
3.1 Local compactness
Local compactness, which aims to reduce the divergence between the represen-
tations of an adversarial example and its clean example in an intermediate layer,
is one of the key aspects of our proposed method. Let us denote our deep neural
network by hθ (·), which decomposes into hθ (·) = gθ (fθ (·)) where the first (gen-
erator) network fθ maps the data examples onto an intermediate layer where we
enforce the compactness constraints. The following (classifier) network gθ maps
the intermediate representations to the prediction output. For local compactness,
given a clean data example x, denote Aε as a stochastic adversary that renders
adversarial examples for x as xa ∼ Aε (x) in a ball Bε (x) = {x′ : ‖x− x′‖ < ε},
our aim is to compress the representations of x and xa in the intermediate layer
by minimizing
Llccom = Ex∼Dx
[
Exa∼Aε(x)
[
‖fθ(x)− fθ(xa)‖p
]]
(1)
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where we use Dx = {x1, ..., xN} to represent both training examples and the
corresponding empirical distribution and ‖·‖p with p = 1, 2,∞ to specify the
p-norm.
3.2 Global compactness
For global compactness, we want the representations of data examples in the
same class to be closer and data examples in different classes to be more separate.
As demonstrated later, global compactness in conjunction with the clustering
assumption helps increase the margin of a data example (i.e., the distance from
that data example to the decision boundary), hence boosting the generalization
capacity of the classifier network and adversarial robustness.
More specifically, given two examples (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) drawn from the
empirical distribution over Dx,y = {(x1, y1) , ..., (xN , yN )} where the label yk ∈
{1, 2, ...,M}, we compute the weight wij for this pair as follows:
wij =
α− Iyi 6=yj
α
=
{
1 if yi = yj
α−1
α otherwise
(2)
where IS is the indicator function which returns 1 if S holds and 0 otherwise.
We consider α ∈ (0, 1), yielding wij < 0 if yi 6= yj and wij > 0 if otherwise.
We enforce global compactness by minimizing
Lgbcom = E(xi,yi),(xj ,yj)∼Dx,y
[
wij ‖fθ(xi)− fθ(xj)‖p
]
(3)
where we overload the notation Dx,y to represent the empirical distribution over
the training set, which implies that the intermediate representations fθ(xi) and
fθ(xj) are encouraged to be closer if yi = yj and to be separate if yi 6= yj for a
global compact representation.
Note that in our experiment, we set α = 0.99, yielding wij ∈ {1,−0.01}, and
calculate global compactness with each random minibatch.
3.3 Clustering assumption and label supervision
At this stage, we have achieved compact intermediate representations for the
clean data and adversarial examples obtained from a stochastic adversary Aε.
Our next step is to enforce some constraints on the subsequent classifier network
gθ to further exploit this compact representation for improving adversarial ro-
bustness. The first constraint we impose on the classifier network gθ is that this
should classify both clean data and adversarial examples correctly by minimizing
Lc = E(x,y)∼Dx,y
[
Exa∼Aε(x) [` (hθ (xa) , y)] + ` (hθ (x) , y)
]
(4)
where ` is the cross-entropy loss function.
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In addition to this label supervision, the second constraint we impose on the
classifier network gθ is the clustering assumption [3], which states that the de-
cision boundary of gθ in the intermediate space should not break into any high
density region (or cluster) of data representations in the intermediate space,
forcing the boundary to lie in gaps formed by those clusters. The clustering
assumption when combined with the global compact representation property
should increase the data example margin (i.e., the distance from that data ex-
ample to the decision boundary). If this is further combined with the fact that
the representations of adversarial examples are compressed into the representa-
tion of its clean data example (i.e. local compactness) this should also reduce
the chance that adversarial examples are misclassified. To enforce the clustering
assumption, inspired by [25], we encourage the classifier confidence by minimiz-
ing the conditional entropy and maintain classifier smoothness using Virtual
Adversarial Training (VAT) [20], respectively:
Lconf = Ex∼Dx
[
Exa∼Aε(x)
[−hθ(xa)T log hθ(xa)]− hθ(x)T log hθ(x)] (5)
Lsmt = Ex∼Dx
[
Exa∼Aε(x) [DKL (hθ(x)‖hθ(xa))]
]
(6)
3.4 Generating adversarial examples
We can use any adversarial attack algorithm to define the adversary Aε. For
example, Madry et al. [19] proposed to find the worst-case examples xa ,
argmaxx′∈Bε(x)` (x
′, y, θ) using PGD, while Zhang et al. [29] aimed to find the
most divergent examples xa , argmaxx′∈Bε(x)DKL (hθ (x′) || hθ (x)) . By enforc-
ing local/global compactness over the adversarial examples obtained by Aε, we
make them easier to be trained with the label supervision loss in Eq. (4), hence
eventually improving adversarial robustness. The quality of adversarial exam-
ples obviously affects to the overall performance, however, in the experimental
section, we empirically prove that our proposed components can boost the ro-
bustness of the adversarial training frameworks of interest.
3.5 Putting it all together
We combine the relevant terms regarding local/global compactness, label super-
vision, and the clustering assumption and arrive at the following optimization
problem:
min
θ
L , Lc + λlccomLlccom + λgbcomLgbcom + λconfLconf + λsmtLsmt (7)
where λlccom, λ
gb
com, λconf, and λsmt are non-negative trade-off parameters.
In Figure 1, we illustrate how the three components, namely local/global
compactness, label supervision, and the clustering assumption can mutually col-
laborate to improve adversarial robustness. The representations of data examples
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Fig. 1. Overview of Adversary Divergence Reduction Network. The local/global com-
pactness and clustering assumption are intended to improve adversarial robustness.
via the network fθ are enforced to be locally/globally compact, whereas the po-
sition of the decision boundary of the classifier network gθ in the intermediate
space is enforced using the clustering assumption. Ideally, with the clustering
assumption, the decision boundary of gθ preserves the cluster structure in the
intermediate space and when combined with label supervision training ensures
clusters in a class remain completely inside the decision region for this class.
Moreover, global compactness encourages clusters of a class to be closer and
those of different classes to be more separate. As a result, the decision boundary
of gθ lies in the gaps among clusters as well as with a sufficiently large margin for
the data examples. Finally, local compactness requires adversarial examples to
stay closer to their corresponding clean data example, hence reducing the chance
of misclassifying them and therefore improving adversarial robustness.
Comparison with the contrastive learning. Interestingly, the contrastive
learning [4,9] and our proposed method aim to learn better representations by
the principle of enforcing similar elements to be equal and dissimilar elements
to be different. However, the contrastive learning works on an instance level,
which enforces the representation of an image to be proximal with those of
its transformations and to be distant with those of any other images. On the
other hand, our method works on a class level, which enforces the intermediate
representations of each class to be compact and well separated with those in
other classes. Therefore, our method and the contrastive learning complement
each other and intuitively improve both visual representation and adversarial
robustness when combining together.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the general setting for our experiments re-
garding datasets, model architecture, optimization scheduler, and adversary at-
tackers. Second, we compare our method with adversarial training with PGD,
namely ADV [19] and TRADES [29]. We employ either ADV or TRADES as
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the stochastic adversary A for our ADR and demonstrate that, when enhanced
with local/global compactness and the clustering assumption, we can improve
these state-of-the-art adversarial training methods.
Specifically, we begin this section with an ablation study to investigate the
model behaviors and the influence of each component, namely local compactness,
global compactness, and the clustering assumption, on adversarial performance.
In addition, we visualize the smoothness of the loss surface of our model to under-
stand why it can defend well. Finally, we undertake experiments on the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets to compare our ADR with both ADV and TRADES.
4.1 Experimental setting
General setting We undertook experiments on both the MNIST [16] and
CIFAR-10 [13] datasets. The inputs were normalized to [0, 1]. For the CIFAR-
10 dataset, we apply random crops and random flips as describe in [19] during
training. For the MNIST dataset, we used the standard CNN architecture with
three convolution layers and three fully connected layers described in [2]. For the
CIFAR-10 dataset, we used two architectures in which one is the standard CNN
architecture described in [2] and another is the ResNet architecture used in [19].
We note that there is a serious overfitting problem on the CIFAR-10 dataset as
mentioned in [2]. In our setting, with the standard CNN architecture, we even-
tually obtained a 98% training accuracy, but only a 75% testing accuracy. With
the ResNet architecture, we used the strategy from [19] to adjust the learning
rate when training to reduce the gap between the training and validation accu-
racies. For the MNIST dataset, a drop-rate equal to 0.1 at epochs 55, 75, and 90
without weight decay was employed. For the CIFAR-10 dataset, the drop-rate
was set to 0.1 at epochs 100 and 150 with weight decay equal to 2 × 10−4. We
use a momentum-based SGD optimizer for the training of the standard CNN
for the MNIST dataset and the ResNet for the CIFAR-10 dataset, while using
the Adam optimizer for training the standard CNN on the CIFAR-10 one. The
hyperparameters setting can be found in the supplementary material.
Choosing the intermediate layer. The intermediate layer for enforcing
compactness constraints immediately follows on from the last convolution layer
for the standard CNN architecture and from the penultimate layer for the ResNet
architecture. Moreover, we provide an additional ablation study to investigate
the importance of choosing the intermediate layer which can be found in the
supplementary material.
Attack methods We use PGD to challenge the defense methods in this paper.
Specifically, the setting for the MNIST dataset is PGD-40 (i.e., PGD with 40
steps) with the distortion bound ε increasing from 0.1 to 0.7 and step size η ∈
{0.01, 0.02}, while that for CIFAR-10 is PGD-20 with ε increasing from 0.0039 (≈
1/255) to 0.11 (≈ 28/255) and step size η ∈ {0.0039, 0.007}. The distortion
metric is l∞ for all attacks. For the adversarial training, we use k = 10 for
CIFAR10 and k = 20 for MNIST for all defense methods.
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Non-targeted and multi-targeted attack scenarios We used two types
of attack scenarios, namely non-targeted and multi-targeted attacks. The non-
targeted attack derives adversarial examples by maximizing the loss w.r.t. its
clean data label, whilst the multi-targeted attack is undertaken by performing
simultaneously targeted attack for all possible data labels. The multi-targeted
attack is considered to be successful if any individual targeted attack on each
target label is successful. While the non-targeted attack considers only one direc-
tion of the gradient, the multi-targeted attack takes multi-directions of gradient
into account, which guarantees to get better local optimum.
4.2 Experimental results
In this section, we first conduct an ablation study using the MNIST dataset
in order to investigate how the different components (local compactness, global
compactness, and the clustering assumption) contribute to adversarial robust-
ness. We then conduct experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets to
compare our proposed method with ADV and TRADES. Further evaluation can
be found in the supplementary material.
Ablation study We first study how each proposed component contributes to
adversarial robustness. We use adversarial training with PGD as the baseline
model and experiment on the MNIST dataset. Recall that our method consists
of three components: the local compactness loss Llccom, the global compactness
loss Lgbcom, and the clustering assumption loss which combines {Lsmt + Lconf} .
In this experiment, we simply set the trade-off parameters λlccom, λ
gb
com, λsmt =
λconf = λca to 0/1 to deactivate/activate the corresponding component. We
consider two metrics: the natural accuracy (i.e., the clean accuracy) and the
robustness accuracy to evaluate a defense method. The natural accuracy is that
evaluated on the clean test images, while the robustness accuracy is that evalu-
ated on adversarial examples generated by attacking the clean test images. It is
noteworthy that for many existing defense methods, improving robustness accu-
racy usually harms natural accuracy. Therefore, our proposed method aims to
reach a better trade-off between the two metrics.
Table 1 shows the results for the PGD attack with k = 40, ε = 0.325, and η =
0.01. We note that ADR-None is our base model without any additional compo-
nents. The base model can be any adversarial training based method, e.g., ADV
or TRADES. Without loss of generality, we use ADV as the base model, i.e.,
ADR-None. By gradually combining the proposed additional components with
ADR-None we produce several variants of ADR (e.g., ADR+LC is ADR-None
together with the local compactness component). Since the standard model was
trained without any defense mechanism, its natural accuracy is high at 99.5%
whereas the robustness accuracy is very poor at 0.88%, indicating its vulner-
ability to adversarial attacks. Regarding the variants of our proposed models,
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those with additional components generally achieve higher robustness accuracies
compared with ADR-None (i.e. ADV), without hurting the natural accuracy. In
addition, the robust accuracy was significantly improved with global compact-
ness and the clustering assumption terms.
Fig. 2. Variation of the robustness accura-
cies under different attack strengths. The
base model is ADV (ADR-None).
Table 1. Results of the PGD-40 at-
tack on the MNIST dataset for the base
ADV model together with its variants
with the different components (LC =
local compactness, GB = global com-
pactness, CA = clustering assumption)
and ε = 0.325.
Nat. acc. Rob. acc.
Standard model 99.5% 0.84%
ADR-None (ADV)a 99.27% 88.1%
ADR+LC 99.41% 91.43%
ADR+LC/GB 99.35% 94.52%
ADR+LC/GB/CA 99.36% 94.96%
a The performance of ADV is lower
than that in [19] because of the dif-
ference of the attack strength and
model architecture
We also evaluate the metrics of interest with different attack strength by
increasing the distortion boundary ε as shown in Figure 2. By just adding a
single local compactness component, our method can improve the base model
(ADV or ADR-None) for attacks with strength ε ≤ 0.35. By adding the global
compactness component, our method can significantly improve over the base
model, especially for stronger attacks. Recall that as we generate adversarial
examples from the PGD attack with k = 20, εd = 0.3, η = 0.01 to train the
defense models, is is unsurprised to see a model defends well with ε ≤ 0.3.
Interestingly, by adding our components, our defense methods can also achieve
reasonably good robustness accuracy of 80%, even when ε varies from 0.34 to
0.37, indicating the better generality of our methods.
To gain a better understanding of the contribution of the local compactness
component, we visualize the loss surface of the base model (ADV as ADR-
None) and the base model with only the local compactness term (ADR+LC).
In Figure 3, the left image is a clean data example x, while the middle image is
the loss surface over the input region around x in which the z-axis indicates the
cross-entropy loss w.r.t. the true label (the higher value means more incorrect
prediction) and the x- and y-axis indicates the variance of the input image along
the gradient direction w.r.t. x and a random orthogonal direction, respectively.
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By varying along the two axes, we create a grid of images which represents
the neighborhood region around x. The right-hand image depicts the predicted
labels corresponding with this input grid.
Fig. 3. Loss surface at local region of a clean data example. Top-left: ADR-None w.r.t
input. Top-right: ADR+LC w.r.t input. Bottom-left: ADR-None w.r.t latent. Bottom-
right: ADR+LC w.r.t latent
From Figure 3, for ADR-None, that its neighborhood region is non-smooth,
resulting in incorrect predictions to the label 1 and 4. Meanwhile, for our ADR+LC
method (adversarial training with local compactness), the loss surface w.r.t. the
input is smoother in its neighborhood region, resulting in correct predictions.
In addition, in our method, the prediction surface w.r.t. the latent feature in
the intermediate representation layer is smoother than that w.r.t. input. This
means that our local compactness makes the local region more compact, hence
improving adversarial robustness. Visualization with an adversarial example as
input can be found in our supplementary material which provides more evidence
of our improvement over the base model.
Furthermore, we use t-SNE [18] to visualize the intermediate space for demon-
strating the effect of our global compactness component. We choose to show a
positive adversarial example defined as an adversarial example which success-
fully fools a defense method. We compare the base model (ADV as ADR-None)
with our method with the compactness terms and use t-SNE to project clean
data and adversarial examples onto 2D space as in Figure 4. For ADR-None, its
adversarial examples seem to distribute more broadly and randomly. With our
global compactness constraint, the adversarial examples look well-clustered in
a low density region, while rarely present in the high density region of natural
clean images. We leverage the entropy of the prediction probability of examples
as the third dimension in Figure 5. A lower entropy mean that the prediction is
more confident (i.e., closer to a one-hot vector) and vice versa. It can be observed
that for the base model, the prediction outputs of adversarial examples seem to
be randomly distributed, while for our ADR+LC/GB method, the prediction
outputs of adversarial examples mainly lie in the high entropy region and are
well-separated from those of the clean data examples. In other words, adversar-
ial examples can be more easily detected from clean examples in our method,
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according to the predication entropy. In addition, the visualization for a negative
adversarial example can be found in our supplementary material.
Fig. 4. T-SNE visualization of latent space. Black triangles are (positive) adversarial
examples while others are clean images. Left: ADR-None. Right: ADR+LC/GB
Fig. 5. T-SNE visualization of latent space with entropy of the prediction probability.
Black triangles are (positive) adversarial examples while others are clean images. Left:
ADR-None. Right: ADR+LC/GB
To summarize, in this ablation study, we have demonstrated how our pro-
posed components can improve adversarial robustness. In the next section, we
will compare the best variant (with all components) of our method with both
ADV and TRADES on more complex datasets to highlight the capability of our
method.
Experiment on the MNIST dataset We compare our method with ADV and
TRADES on the MNIST dataset. For our method, in addition to using its full
version with all of the proposed terms, we consider two variants ADR-ADV and
ADR-TRADES wherein the adversary A is set to be ADV and TRADES respec-
tively. We use PGD/TRADES generated adversarial examples with k = 20, εd =
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Fig. 6. Robust accuracy against PGD attack on MNIST. Base models include ADV
and TRADES. Left: η = 0.01. Right: η = 0.02
0.3, ηd = 0.01 for adversarial training as proposed in [19] and employ the PGD at-
tack with k = 40, using two iterative size η ∈ {0.01, 0.02} and different distortion
boundaries ε to attack. The results shown in Figure 6 illustrate that our variants
outperform the baselines, especially for {ε = εd = 0.3, η = 0.01}. For example,
our ADR-ADV improves ADV by 2.4% (from 94.15% to 96.55%) while ADR-
TRADES boosts TRADES by 2.07% (from 93.64% to 95.71%). While for attack
setting { = d = 0.3, η = 0.02}, our method improves ADV and TRADES by
4.0% and 3.8% respectively. Moreover, the improvement gap increases when the
attack goes stronger.
Experiment on the CIFAR-10 dataset We conduct experiments on the
CIFAR-10 dataset under two different architectures: standard CNN from [2] and
ResNet from [19]. We set k = 10, εd = 0.031, ηd = 0.007 for ADV and TRADES
and use a PGD attack with k = 20, η ∈ {0.0039, 0.007} and different distortion
boundary ε. The results for standard CNN architecture in figure 7 show that our
methods significantly improve over the baselines. Moreover, the results for stan-
dard CNN architecture at a checking point {ε = εd = 0.031, η = ηd = 0.007}
in Table 2 show that our methods significantly outperform their baselines in
terms of natural and robust accuracies. Moreover, Figure 7 indicates that our
proposed methods can defend better in a wide range of attack strength. Particu-
larly, when with varied distortion boundary ε in [0.02, 0.1], our proposed methods
always produce better robust accuracies than its baselines. Finally, the results
for ResNet architecture in Table 2 show a slight improvement of our methods
comparing with ADV but around 2.5% improvement from TRADES on both
Non-targeted and Multi-targeted attacks.3 The quality of adversarial examples
and the chosen network architecture obviously affects the overall performance,
3 The performance of TRADES is influenced by the model architectures and parameter
tunings. The works [22,11] also reported that TRADES cannot surpass ADV all the
time which explains the lower performance of TRADES on ResNet architecture in
this paper. More analysis can be found in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 7. Robust accuracy against PGD attack on CIFAR-10, using Standard CNN archi-
tecture. Base models include ADV and TRADES. Left: η = 0.0039. Right: η = 0.007.
however, in this experiment, we empirically prove that our proposed components
can boost the robustness under different combinations of the adversarial training
frameworks and network architectures.
Table 2. Robustness comparison on the CIFAR-10 dataset against PGD attack at
k = 20,  = 0.031, η = 0.007 using Standard CNN and ResNet architectures
Standard CNN ResNet
Nat. acc. Non-target Mul-target Nat. acc. Non-target Mul-target
Standard model 75.27% 12.26% 0.00% 92.51% 0.00% 0.00%
ADV 67.86% 33.12% 18.73% 78.84% 44.08% 41.20%
TRADES 71.37% 35.84% 18.01% 83.27% 37.52% 35.05%
ADR-ADV 69.09% 37.67% 22.58% 78.43% 44.72% 41.43%
ADR-TRADES 69.0% 39.68% 26.7% 82.02% 40.17% 37.70%
5 Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that adversarial training has been one of the few
defense models resilient to various attack types against deep neural network
models. In this paper, we have shown that by enforcing additional components,
namely local/global compactness constraints together with the clustering as-
sumption, we can further improve the state-of-the-art adversarial training mod-
els. We have undertaken comprehensive experiments to investigate the effect of
each component and have demonstrated the capability of our proposed methods
in enhancing adversarial robustness using real-world datasets.
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Supplementary to “Improving Adversarial
Robustness by Enforcing Local and Global
Compactness”
6 Hyperparameters
The hyperparameters for our experiments as Table 3. The hyperparameters of
local compactness, global compactness, and smoothness are set to be either 1 or
0, meaning they are switched ON/OFF. Although finer tuning of these param-
eters can lead to better results, our method outperforms the baselines in these
initial settings, which demonstrates the effectiveness of those components.
Table 3. Hyper-parameter setting for the experiment section
λlccom λ
gb
com λsmt λconf
MNIST 1. 1. 1. 0.
CIFAR-10-CNN 1. 1. 1. 1.
CIFAR-10-ResNet 1. 1. 1. 0.
7 Model architectures and experimental setting
We summarize the experimental setting in Table 4.
For the MNIST dataset, we used the standard CNN architecture with three
convolution layers and three fully connected layers described in [2]. For the
CIFAR-10 dataset, we used two architectures in which one is the standard CNN
architecture described in [2] and another is the ResNet architecture used in [19].
The ResNet architecture has 5 residual units with (16, 16, 32, 64) filters each.
We choose the convolution layers as the Generator and the last fully connected
layers as the Classifier for ResNet architecture. The standard CNN architectures
are redescribed as follow:
CNN-4C3F(32) Generator: 2×Conv(32)→Max Pooling→ 2×Conv(32)→
Max Pooling→ Flatten
CNN-4C3F(32) Classifier: FC(200)→ ReLU→Dropout(0.5)→ FC(200)→
ReLU→ FC(10)→ Softmax
CNN-4C3F(64) Generator: 2×Conv(64)→Max Pooling→ 2×Conv(64)→
Max Pooling→ Flatten
CNN-4C3F(64) Classifier: FC(256)→ ReLU→Dropout(0.5)→ FC(256)→
ReLU→ FC(10)→ Softmax
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8 Choosing the intermediate layer
The intermediate layer for enforcing compactness constraints immediately fol-
lows on from the generator. We additionally conduct an ablation study to in-
vestigate the importance of choosing the intermediate layer and report natural
accuracy and robust accuracy against non-targeted/multiple-targeted attacks
respectively. We use the standard CNN architecture (which has 4 Convolu-
tion layers in Generator and 3 FC layers in Classifier), with four additional
variants corresponding to different choices of the intermediate layer (right af-
ter the generator). We use PGD (k = 100,  = 0.3, η = 0.01 for MNIST,
k = 100,  = 0.031, η = 0.007 for CIFAR-10) to evaluate these models. It can be
seen from the results as showing in Table 5 that the performance slightly down-
grades if choosing shallower layers. The higher impact is expected on a larger
architecture (i.e., Resnet), which can be investigated in future.
9 The performance of TRADES
TRADES aims to find the most divergent adversarial examples, while ADV
aims to find the worst-case examples to improve a model (see Sec. 2.2 in our
paper for more detail). Hence theoretically, there is no guarantee that TRADES
outperforms ADV. In practice, the performance of TRADES is influenced by the
classifier architectures and parameter tunings. The works [22,11] also reported
that TRADES cannot surpass ADV all the time (Table 1 and footnote 8 in [22],
Table 1 in [11]), which is in line with the findings in our paper.
10 Further experiments
We conduct an additional evaluation with further state-of-the-art attack meth-
ods (e.g., the Basic Iterative Method - BIM [14] and the Momentum Iterative
Method - MIM [6]) to convince that our method indeed boots the robustness
rather than suffers the gradient obfuscation [1]. Three attack methods PGD,
BIM and MIM share the same setting, i.e., {k = 100,  = 0.3, η = 0.01} for
MNIST and {k = 100,  = 0.031, η = 0.007} for CIFAR-10. The result as in
Table 6 show that our components can improve the robustness of the baseline
framework against all three kind of attacks which again proves the efficacy of
our method.
10.1 Loss surface of adversarial examples
We separate adversarial examples into two classes: positive adversarial exam-
ple which successfully fools a defense method and negative adversarial example
which is an unsuccessful attack. The loss surface of positive adversarial example
as Figure 8. In particular, both ADV (ADR-None) and our method (ADR+LC)
predicted xa with the label 8, whereas its true label is 3. From Figure 8, it is
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Table 4. Experimental settings for our experiments. The model architectures are from
[2] [19] and redescribed in the supplementary material.
MNIST CIFAR-10 (CNN) CIFAR-10 (Resnet)
Architectures CNN-4C3F(32)[2] CNN-4C3F(64)[2] RN-34-10[19]
Optimizer SGD Adam SGD
Learning rate 0.01 0.001 0.1
Momentum 0.9 N/A 0.9
Training stratery Batch size 128, 100 epochs Batch size 128, 200 epochs Batch size 128, 200 epochs
Perturbation k = 20, d = 0.3, ηd = 0.01, l∞ k = 10, d = 0.031, ηd = 0.007, l∞ k = 10, d = 0.031, ηd = 0.007, l∞
Table 5. Performance comparison on different choices of the intermediate layer.
The results in each setting are natural accuracy and robust accuracy against non-
targeted/multiple-targeted attacks respectively.
MNIST CIFAR10
G=2Conv, C=2Conv+3FC 99.52/93.88/92.78 68.78/36.46/21.99
G=3Conv, C=1Conv+3FC 99.44/94.38/93.59 69.17/37.05/22.44
CNN (G=4Conv, C=3FC) 99.48/95.06/94.26 69.08/37.06/22.44
G=4Conv+1FC, C=2FC 99.51/94.38/93.47 69.39/37.31/22.87
G=4Conv+2FC, C=1FC 99.52/94.26/93.45 69.13/37.31/22.57
Table 6. Robustness comparison on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets using Stan-
dard CNN with higher attack iteration (i.e., k = 100). The results in each setting are
natural accuracy and robust accuracy against non-targeted/multiple-targeted attacks
respectively.
Dataset ADV ADR-ADV
PGD MNIST 99.43/93.13/92.09 99.48/95.06/94.26
BIM MNIST 99.43/93.00/91.70 99.48/94.86/93.99
MIM MNIST 99.43/94.05/92.63 99.48/95.41/94.56
PGD CIFAR-10 67.61/32.87/18.74 69.16/36.85/22.71
BIM CIFAR-10 67.61/32.89/18.71 69.16/36.82/22.69
MIM CIFAR-10 67.61/33.00/18.59 69.16/36.96/22.56
20 A. Bui et al.
evident that for ADV, that most of its neighborhood region is non-smooth, re-
sulting in incorrect predictions in almost all of the grid. By contrast, for our
method (ADR+LC), the loss surface w.r.t. the input is smoother, resulting in
more correct predictions in this neighborhood region. In addition, in our method,
the prediction surface w.r.t. the latent feature in the intermediate representation
layer is smoother than that w.r.t. input. This means that our local compactness
makes the local region more compact, hence improving adversarial robustness.
We provide the loss surface of negative adversarial examples from adversarial
training method and adversarial training with our components as Figure 9. Both
examples show that the loss function smooth in local region of an adversarial
example.
Fig. 8. Loss surface at local region of a positive adversarial example. Top-left: ADR-
None w.r.t input. Top-right: ADV+LC w.r.t input. Bottom-left: ADR-None w.r.t la-
tent. Bottom-right: ADV+LC w.r.t latent
Fig. 9. Loss surface at local region of a negative adversarial example. Top-left: ADR-
None w.r.t input. Top-right: ADV+LC w.r.t input. Bottom-left: ADR-None w.r.t la-
tent. Bottom-right: ADV+LC w.r.t latent
Improving Adversarial Robustness by Local and Global Compactness 21
10.2 T-SNE visualization of adversarial examples
In addition to positive adversarial examples, we provide the t-SNE visualization
of the negative adversarial examples from adversarial training (ADR-None) and
adversarial training with our components (ADR+LC/GB) as Figure 10. In ad-
versarial training method, the unsuccessful attacks have been mixed insight the
natural/clean data. In contrast, in case adversarial training with our components,
the attack representation consistently is separated from those from natural data,
similar to positive adversarial examples. Additionally, the unsuccessful attacks
in adversarial training have the same confidence level with natural data, while
those in our methods are totally different levels. In summary, our method can
produce a better latent representation which is well separated between natural
data and adversarial example (both positive and negative). This feature can be
used for adversarial detection.
Fig. 10. T-SNE visualization of latent space. Black triangles are (negative) adversarial
examples while others are clean images. Left: ADR-None. Right: ADR+LC/GB
Fig. 11. T-SNE visualization with entropy of prediction with entropy of prediction
probability. Black triangles are (negative) adversarial examples while others are clean
images. Left: ADR-None. Right: ADR+LC/GB
